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FEUDAL AND COMMON-LAW CHARACTERISTICS
OF FUTURE INTERESTS IN ILLINOIS*
ERNEST

T
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FEE UPON A FEE BY DEED IN ILLINOIS

HE case of Harder v. Mathews' settled a long standg uncertainty as to whether a fee may be limited
upon a fee in the same deed by holding that where, for
an express consideration, a grantor aliens, releases,
remises, and quitclaims to a grantee and her heirs with
a gift over in fee if the grantee shall die without living
descendants, the Statute of Uses will operate to transfer
the seizin by shifting use to the second taker upon the
happening of the condition.
The uncertainty as to the validity of such shifting
interests was due to two lines of cases, one of which held
invalid all shifting interests by deed.' In some of these
cases the decision was based upon the grounds of repugnancy and in others by the statement of the common-law
rule that a fee cannot be mounted upon a fee in a deed but
may by way of executory devise. Palmer v. Cook 3 is the
only case actually holding an ordinary shifting interest
by deed to be void-the statements thereof in the other
first half of this article appeared at p. 17 of this volume.
309 Ill. 548, 141 N. E. 442 (1923).
2 Siegwald v. Siegwald, 37 Ill. 431 (1865) ; Peoria v. Darst, 101 Ill. 609
(1882) ; Summers v. Smith, 127 Ill. 645, 21 N. E. 191 (1889) ; McCambell v.
Mason, 151 Ill. 500, 38 N. E. 672 (1894) ; Smith v. Kimbell, 153 I1. 368,
38 N. E. 1029 (1894) ; Palmer v. Cook, 159 Ill. 300, 42 N. E. 796 (1896) ;
Glover v. Condell, 163 Ili. 566, 45 N. E. 173 (1896) ; Stewart v. Stewart, 186
I1. 60, 57 N. E. 885 (1900) ; Kron v. Kron, 195 Ill. 181, 62 N. E. 809 (1902).
8 159 I1. 300, 42 N. E. 796 (1896).
*The
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cases are dicta-and the only case sufficient to have cast
grave doubt upon the validity of such limitations.
The later cases 4 all contain dicta indicating a trend in
the direction of recognition of shifting interests in a
deed, and in the majority of them the decision was
grounded upon the principle that such interests were good
as a conveyance under the Statute of Uses.
The long conflict of decision was apparently due to
the fact that both the principles of the common law and
a system of conveyancing, developed under the Statute
of Uses, existed side by side in the Illinois law. There
was a reluctance by some courts to overturn the old
feudal rule that a fee upon a fee in a common-law conveyance is void. In the later decisions the courts gave more
consideration to the fact that conveyances by deed in
Illinois have always taken effect under the Statute of
Uses by way of bargain and sale or a covenant to stand
seized,5 and it was upon this ground that the court in
Harderv. Mathews stood and finally (in 1923) committed
the Illinois law to the doctrine that a fee may be created
upon a fee in a deed.
SPRINGING FUTURE INTERESTS BY DEED

It seems that conveyances by way of springing use have
always been good in Illinois. However, the question has
been raised as to the nature of the estate held by a grantor after he has made a conveyance in fee effective upon
his death, as by delivering the deed to a third person,
without in express terms reserving to himself a life
estate. The validity of the future interest in the grantee
has been supported upon several theories. One theory is
that the grantor by operation of the conveyance becomes
seized of a life estate and that the grantee's interest takes
4 Cover v. James, 217 Ill.
309, 75 N. E. 490 (1905) ; Johnson v. Buck, 220
I1. 226, 77 N. E. 163 (1906) ; Bauman v. Stoller, 235 Ill.
480, 85 N. E. 657
(1908) ; Brown v. Brown, 247 I1. 528, 93 N. E. 357 (1910) ; Morton v. Babb,
251 I1. 488, 96 N. E. 279 (1911) ; Duffield v. Duffield, 268 Ill.
29, 108 N. E.
673 (1915) ; Pitzer v. Morrison, 272 Ill. 291, 111 N. E. 1017 (1916),
5 Schackelton v. Sebree, 86 111. 616 (1877).
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effect as a remainder.6 Another is that the deed is effective under Section 1 of the Conveyances Act. 7 It might
also be regarded as operative under the Statute of Uses
either as a covenant to stand seized or as a bargain and
sale." It is suggested by Mr. Kales9 that it is preferable
to sustain the limitation after the grantor's death as a
springing interest, which cuts short a resulting fee in the
grantor, and which is valid either under the Statute of
Uses or the Conveyances Act.
RELEASE OF CONTINGENT REMAINDERS AND OTHER

CONTINGENT INTERESTS AT COMMON LAW

The feudal law did not favor contingent remainders or
rights of re-entry, since they were usually adverse to the
interests of tenants in possession. Such interests at best
were only tolerated, and anything which would get rid
of them was looked upon with favor. For this reason
their release was permitted, under certain conditions,
because this would put an end to them and tend to preserve such vested estates as might be subsisting."0 The
remainderman could not alone nor of himself give a
good title so long as the remainder was contingent. He
could not complete the title immediately except by the
assistance of the persons having vested interests. In
some instances this would be the person in whom the reversion in fee was vested by resulting use, or it might
be the heir at law of the former owner by whose will the
contingent remainder was created. Whenever the fee was
granted under a contingency permitted by the rules of
the common law, the owner of the contingency might release to the person having a vested inheritance or the
latter could join with the contingent remainderman in a
6 Harshbarger v. Carroll, 163 I1. 636, 45 N. E. 565 (1896); Latimer v.
Latimer, 174 Ill. 418, 51 N. E. 548 (1898).
7 Schackelton v. Sebree, 86 Ill. 616 (1877).
8 Vinson v. Vinson, 4 Ill. App. 138 (1879); Roe v. Tranmer, 2 Wils. 75,
95 Eng. Rep. 694 (1757).
9 Albert M. Kales, Estates, Future Interests, and Illegal Conditions and
Restraints in Illinois (2d ed., Callaghan & Co., Chicago, 1920), p. 537, § 465.
10 Lampet's Case, 10 Rep. 48a and 48b (1612).
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release to a third person. The weight of authority supported the view that, when the fee was granted in contingency, the inheritance was considered to be in abeyance or expectation and not vested in any person; so the
former owner then had only a possibility of reverter as
distinguished from an actual reversion." The possibility
of release would seem to have been the same whether this
interest was a reversion or only a possibility of reverter.
A contingent remainder to B and his heirs was looked
upon as only a possibility of obtaining an estate and was
to be treated like a possibility of reverter which could not
be conveyed to another by deed of grant.
The release was available only to effect the future interest where it operated, not as a conveyance by way of
enlargement of the releasee's interest, but by way of
extinguishment of the releasor's interest. 2 The release
to have any effect must run to him whose interest would
be defeated by the vesting of the contingent remainder
which is released, and it was effective only so far as the
taking effect of the future interest in possession would
cut short or interfere with the interest of the releasee.
This principle permitted a contingent remainder after a
life estate to be released to the reversioner. 18 The release
by the holder of a future interest to a person whose interest would not be affected by the taking effect of the latter
interest was not permitted. For example, if the limitations were to A for life, remainder to B in fee if he survive A, but over to C in fee if A survive B, C's attempted
release to A would be ineffective. It could not operate
by way of extinguishing B's interest but only by way of
enlarging A's interest by adding to it by means of a conveyance."4
11 Richard Preston, Conveyancing (J. and W. T. Clarke, London, 1829),
III, 252-255.
12 Charles Fearne, An Essay on the Learning of Contingent Remainders
and Executory Devises (4th Am. ed., Robert H. Small, Philadelphia, 1845),
421,423.
13 Emory Washburn, A Treatise on the American Law of Real Property
(5th ed., Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1887), II, 641.
14 Lampet's Case, 10 Rep. 46b, 51 (1612).
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Two authorities 15 state that a contingent remainder
cannot be released to the life tenant and that there must
be privity of estate between the releasor and the releasee;
that is, one of their estates must be so related to the
other as to make but one and the same estate in law.
RELEASE OF CONTINGENT

INTERESTS IN ILLINOIS

6

An early Illinois decision stated the rule that a quitclaim deed which grants, sells, and conveys to A all the
right, title, and interest in and to certain lands described, to have and to hold to him, his heirs and assigns
forever, will not vest a subsequently acquired title by the
releasor in the releasee, if the releasor had no interest in
the land at the time the deed was executed. The grantor
had no title at the date of the deed, but subsequently acquired a patent from the United States. It was held that,
since the deed contained no express covenants, and words
of bargain and sale were absent, nothing passed. In
construing the Illinois Conveyances Act then in force,
the courts established the rule that words of bargain and
sale carry implied covenants of warranty, and since there
were neither express nor implied covenants in the deed in
question, the conveyance was not within the provisions
of the act providing for inurement of after acquired
title and that the releasor was not estopped to claim subsequently acquired title. There was no evidence that the
releasor had any claim to the land in question at the
time he executed the deed of release or quitclaim and
the court recognized and stated that this opinion overruled a former contrary decision.' 7 Frink v. Darst is to
be taken, not as indicating that a quitclaim grant of a
contingent remainder or of an executory interest does
not pass, but as indicating that if the so-called interests
are not interests at all but are mere possibilities of hay15

Bacon's Abridgment, Release, c. 4; Blackstone's Commentaries, 325.
16 Frink v. Darst, 14 Ill. 304 (1853).
17 Frisby v. Ballance, 2 Gilm. (I1.) 141 (1845).
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ing an interest nothing passes by such a purported grant.
The court had previously decided 18 that a deed of release and quitclaim is as effectual for the purpose of
transferring existing title to land as a deed of bargain
and sale. The court, in announcing this rule, was departing from the common law doctrine that a release by the
holder of a future interest to a person whose interest
would not be affected by the taking effect of the latter
interest would not be permitted. Although the court
speaks of the transaction in Frink v. Darst as a release,
it should be noted that the deed there under construction
was a statutory quitclaim deed, and that case, as well as
a long list of subsequent cases,' 9 holds that if the conveyance be by a statutory quitclaim deed or a deed containing no covenants, the grantee will never become vested
with the estate, even though the remainder or other interest afterwards vests. In at least one case,20 the court
stated that in order that a contingent remainder pass by
release, after the remainder vests, the release must be
made to the reversioner, that is, to the person in whom.
the fee vested, pending the vesting of the contingent reinul, erI.
It was held in Williams v. Esten2 ' that an executory
devise may be released to the holder of the fee which was
subject to be divested by the vesting of an executory
devise. Williams v. Esten was erroneously cited in one
case2 2 as authority that a contingent remainder may be
released to a life tenant. However, the decision that the
remainder would pass to the life tenant was correct, since
the remainder was created by a deed containing a cove18

McConnel v. Reed, 3 Ill.
371 (1840).

19 The following are cited as typical and are selected at random: Holbrook

v. Debo, 99 Ill.
372 (1881) ; Benneson v. Aiken, 102 Ill.
284 (1882); Smiley
v. Fries, 104 Ill.
416 (1882) ; Torrence v. Shedd, 112 Ill. 466 (1884) ; Glover
v. Condell, 163 Ill. 566, 45 N. E. 173 (1896) ; Williams v. Esten, 179 Ill.
267,
53 N. E. 562 (1899) ; Thompson v. Becker, 194 Ill. 119, 62 N. E. 558 (1902);
Little v. Eaton, 267 Ill. 623, 108 N. E. 727 (1915).
20 Hill v. Hill, 264 Ill. 219, 106 N. E. 262 (1914).
21 179 Ill. 267, 53 N. E. 562 (1899).
22 Ortmayer v. Elcock, 225 Il.342, 80 N. E. 339 (1907).
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nant for further assurance and, if vested, would pass by
estoppel to the life tenant. Still another case, Drury v.
Drury,28 contains dictum stating that a contingent remainder can be released to a life tenant. The court's
statement in Drury v. Drury was not necessary to support
its decision, since the limitation under consideration created a remainder to a class, contingent upon the members
of the class surviving the life tenant. The court held the
remainder to be vested subject to being divested if no
member of the class survived the life tenant. Under this
view, the conveyance was of a vested interest subject
to defeasance, and the case cannot, therefore, be considered as authority that a contingent remainder may be
released to a life tenant. The comparatively few Illinois
cases in which the question has been considered seem to
justify the statement that a contingent remainder can
be released to the reversioner but not to the life tenant
and that springing and shifting future interests are also
inalienable but subject to release under the same conditions as attach to contingent remainders.
It has been held that one who, upon the death of a living person intestate, would be an heir may release his
expectancy to the ancestor, and such a release will be enforced in equity for the benefit of the other heirs. 4
There may be a release of dower by either a husband
or wife to the other by postnuptial agreement,2 5 and it has
been held that, if the instrument is not effective as a
conveyance to release dower, a covenant therein not to
assert a claim to dower is effective by way of estoppel
to bar the spouse from asserting dower in the other's
land. An antenuptial contract between husband and wife
jointly, releasing all interest in the property of the other,
renouncing forever all claims, curtesy, dower, homestead,
271 Ill. 336, 111 N. E. 140 (1916).
Donough v. Garland, 269 Ill. 565, 109 N. E. 1015 (1915); Simmons v.
Ross, 270 Ill. 372, 110 N. E. 507 (1915); Mires v. Laubenheimer, 271 I!I.
296, 111 N. E. 106 (1916).
25 Crum v. Sawyer, 132 Ill. 443, 24 N. E. 956 (1890).
23
24
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etc., has been held to release the widow's award and bars
a claim for it if there are no minor children of the de26
ceased husband living with the widow.
It seems that there may be an express release by a
reversioner of the right to declare or complete a forfeiture.2 7 No Illinois cases directly in point have been
found, but our Supreme Court has frequently held that
the holder of a right of entry or the power of termination
of a fee for breach of condition may, by his or her acts,
waive the breach of the condition. 2 The waivers were
considered as in the nature of implied releases and it
would seem to follow that, if such a case is presented, the
court would hold that an express release of a right to declare a forfeiture would likewise be effective to terminate
the right.
TRANSFERABILITY OF LEGAL CONTINGENT
REMAINDERS AT

COMMON LAw

The non-transferability of contingent remainders has
been previously referred to as an outstanding example of
the survivorship of feudal principles in the Illinois law.
Further discussion of the doctrine and its adoption as a
rule of decision may be facilitated by the following preliminary survey of its origin and evolution which may
be gathered from any authoritative history of the common law.
Legal contingent remainders were both inalienable and
destructible at common law in England and remained so
until comparatively recently. This characteristic of inalienability of contingent remainders is a survival of the
feudal system of landholding, the very existence of which
was threatened by any degree of freedom of alienation
26 Kroell v. Kroell, 219 11. 105, 76 N. E. 63 (1905) ; Pavlicek v. Roessler,
222 Ill. 83, 78 N. E. 11 (1906).
27 Berenbroick v. St. Luke's Hospital, 155 N. Y. 655, 49 N. E. 1093
(1898) ; Brill v. Lynn, 207 Ky. 757, 270 S. W. 20 (1925) ; Sharpe v. N. C. R.
Co., 190 N. C. 350, 129 S. E. 826 (1925).
28 Sherman v. Town of Jefferson, 274 Ill. 294, 113 N. E. 624 (1916)
Sanitary District v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 278 Ill. 529, 116 N. E. 161

(1917).
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of interests in land. Alienation tended to defeat the feudal policy that the lord and the tenant should be bound
by ties of mutual interest and affection. The feudal system began with the theory that the tenant's interest was
inalienable and such alienation as was permitted from
time to time was treated as an exception to the general
rule. The feudal policy was first relaxed to permit the
alienation of vested remainders by grant and at that
time it was not thought worth while to make contingent
remainders alienable in the same manner for the reason
that they were not considered as estates. The first relaxation of the rule of inalienability of contingent remainders
by grant or by any other matter of record took the form
that they might be extinguished by an estoppel raised by
a purported grant of the fee, such as a fine or by suffering a common recovery, although they were not then
capable of actual release. Not all contingent remainders
could be extinguished by estoppel. However, contingent
remainders to the survivors of several persons, or to
such persons as shall be living at a certain time or upon
the happening of a given event are examples of contingent
remainders capable of being extinguished by estoppel
but not by release. 9
Contingent remainders were in some cases descendible
at common law. It was generally held that a contingent
remainder in fee to an ascertained person would pass to
his heirs should he die before the contingency happened,
but in the case of an unascertained remainderman it
would not descend.3 0 An exception to the rule that contingent remainders would descend if the remainderman
was ascertained was the case where the remainderman
died prior to the happening of the contingency and the
contingency was of such a character that his death would
make vesting thereafter impossible. An example of such
Preston, Conveyancing, III, 252-5.
30 Washburn, Real Property, II, 640; Joshua Williams, Real Property
(24th ed., Sweet and Maxwell, Ltd., London, 1926), pp. 438-440.
29
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an exception is the case of a limitation to B in fee after
a life estate to A upon the contingency that B survive A.
If it should happen that A survived B, the remainder
would not descend to B's heirs.
Since freehold land was not devisable at common law
there was of course no question as to the devisability of
contingent remainders until after the Statute of Wills.-1
The courts in construing this statute held at first that
contingent remainders were not the subject of a devise.
Later decisions under this and subsequent statutes established the rule that contingent remainders were devisable only in so far as they had the attributes of descendibility.32 A contingent remainder limited to a living person and his heirs was thus descendible and so remained
in England until January, 1926, prior to which date it
would devolve upon his personal representatives, in trust,
subject to his debts, for his heir or devisee. In case of
his death on or after January 1, 1926, it devolved upon
the personal representatives, in case of the intestacy of
the remainderman and, in case of testacy, on trust, subject to payment of debts, for the devisee.3 '
it was also a rule in equity that an assignment agreed,
for a valuable consideration, to be made of a possibility
should be decreed to be carried into effect. 4 The English
Property Act of 192535 provides that a contingent interest
and a possibility coupled with an interest, whether the
object of the gift or limitation of such interest or possibility be or be not ascertained, may be disposed of by
deed. An heir's expectancy is considered as being but a
bare possibility and so is not assignable at law, but it
has been held that he might make a contract dealing with
his expectancy, and equity will require specific performance of such contract if made for a valuable considera31 32 Henry VIII, c. 1 (1540).
32
33

Fearne, Contingent Remainders, pp. 366-71.
15 Geo., c. 23.

4

Fearne, Contingent Remainders, pp. 550-1.

35 15 Geo. V, c. 20, s. 4 and s. 51.
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tion. Such a contract has been held to operate in equity
as an assignment of the expectancy. 6
The feudal rule of inalienability of legal contingent
interests was never applied to equitable contingent interests, since at all times the legal seizin was outstanding
in the trustee. The transfer of an existing equitable
interest in land required no formal act. Prior to the
Statute of Frauds, the transfer could be by parol, and
thereafter the only requirement was a writing signed by
37
the transferor.
ESTOPPEL BY COVENANTS OF WARRANTY

If the contingent remainderman attempted to alienate
by a deed with warranties and the remainder vested in
his life time, the remainder would at common law pass
to the alienee by way of estoppel where the mode of
assurance was a feoffment, a fine, or a common recovery,
and also where the assurance was by lease.3 8
If the contingent remainderman should die after he
attempts to convey with warranties and the remainder
descends to his heirs, the question arises as to whether
the remainder will then inure to the grantee of the ancestor. The heir of the warrantor seems to have been
bound at common law if he was expressly named in the
covenant and assets descended to him. 9 By the ancient
feudal warranty, which was implied from a conveyance
by feoffment, the heir was estopped to deny the title of
his ancestor's feoffee by the doctrine of "lineal warranty. " During the reign of Queen Anne, "lineal warranties" were substantially abolished in England, and
thereafter the heir, not being bound by the estoppel,
would be entitled to the remainder after the contingency
36 Williams, Real Property, p. lOOn.

3T Thomas Lewin, Practical Treatise on the Law of Trusts (13th ed.,
Sweet and Maxwell, Ltd., London, 1928), pp. 45 et seq., 679.
8 William Henry Rawle, Practical Treatise on the Law of Covenants
for Title (5th ed., Little, Brown and Co., Boston, 1887), § 243.
39 Ibid., § 309.
40 Ibid., § 238.
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happened. 41 The ancient implied feudal warranty was applicable only to feoffments and disappeared when the
practice of conveyancing by this means was discontinued.
It seems that the feudal policy of hostility to the transferability of contingent interests must be considered as
abandoned whenever the law provides means for their
transfer. The English courts made the first step in this
direction in Weale v. Lower,42 in 1672, by a new application of the doctrine of estoppel by deed. Although it had
long been recognized that after acquired title would pass
by a deed containing covenants of warranty, Weale v.
Lower seems to be the first case wherein the English
courts held that an attempted transfer of a contingent
interest by way of deed containing covenants of warranty
would, under the doctrine of estoppel, pass the title to
the transferee in the event the contingency is resolved in
favor of the transferor. The fact that the actual transfer of the contingent interest was postponed until it
vested in the transferor indicates that the courts continued to recognize the old distinction between an interest
and the possibility of an interest. The actual transfer
oc
inte
e
by devise was postponed in England for nearly a century thereafter" and their transfer
inter vivos was first permitted by statutory provision.4 4
TRANSFER OF CONTINGENT INTERESTS IN ILLINoIs--ExTENT
OF TRANSFERABILITY BY ESTOPPEL AND BY INUREMENT

UNDER THE PRovisIoNs OF THE CONvEYAxcEs ACT

The Illinois decisions, in some aspects, leave the law of
transferability in a state of uncertainty, but there is no
doubt that contingent interests do not pass after an attempted transfer inter vivos until the happening of the
4 Anne, c. 16, s. 9; Rawle, op. cit., § 11.
Poll. 65 (1672).
Fearne, Contingent Remainders, pp. 366, 371; Thomas Jarman, A
Treatise on Wills (5th ed., Frederick Linn & Co., Jersey City, 1881), II, 240
et seq., III, 741, n. 4.
44 9 Vict., c. 106, s. 6 (1845).
41
42
48
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contingency vesting the interest in the transferor and in
some cases in his heirs. In other words, we are still following the 17th century English doctrine of estoppel by
deed exemplified in Weale v. Lower, except as modified
by our Conveyances Act providing for inurement of title.
There is no other remnant of the feudal land law more
persistently present in the Illinois law than the characteristic that remainders are inalienable to a stranger so long
as they remain contingent. That contingent remainders
or other interests are not transferable by deed, either
quitclaim or warranty, nor by devise or execution sale
is evidenced by a long line of cases. 4 ' In such of these
decisions as involved the transferability inter vivos of
contingent interests after the resolution of the contingency, the courts have given effect to the common-law
doctrine of estoppel by deed insofar as it was not inconsistent with the provisions of the Conveyances Act providing for inurement of title.
The pertinent provisions of the Illinois Conveyances
Act 46 are as follows:
§ 7. If any person shall sell and convey to another, by deed
or conveyance, purporting to convey an estate in fee simple

absolute, in any tract of land or real estate, lying and being in
this state, not then being possessed of the legal estate or interest

therein at the time of sale and conveyance, but after such sale
and conveyance the vendor shall become possessed of and confirmed in the legal estate to the land or real estate so sold and
conveyed, it -shall be taken and held to be in trust and for the
use of the grantee or vendee; and the conveyance aforesaid shall
be held and taken, and shall be as valid as if the grantor or
vendor had the legal estate or interest, at the time of said sale
or conveyance.
45 O'Melia v. Mullarky, 124 Ill. 506, 17 N. E. 36
Follansbee, 131 Ill. 147, 23 N. E. 332 (1889) ; Furnish v.
39 N. E. 989 (1895); Butterfield v. Sawyer, 187 Ill.
(1900) ; Golloday v. Knock, 235 Ill. 412, 85 N. E. 649

(1888); Walton v.

Rogers, 154 Ill. 569,
598, 58 N. E. 602
(1908) ; Aetna Life

Ins. Co. v. Hoppin, 249 Ill. 406, 94 N. E. 669 (1911) ; Hull v. Ensinger, 257

Ill. 160, 100 N. E. 513 (1913) ; Pitzer v. Morrison, 272 Ill. 291, 111 N. E.
1017 (1916); Dubois v. July, 291 Ill. 340, 126 N. E. 104 (1920); Raritan
State Bank v. Huston, 329 Ill. 604, 161 N. E. 141 (1928).
46 Ill. Rev. Stats. 1937, Ch. 30, §§ 6, 7 (§§ 7, 8 of the Act of 1872 as
amended in 1881).
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§ 8.

In all deeds whereby any estate of inheritance in fee

simple shall hereafter be limited to the grantee and his heirs, or
other legal representatives, the words "grant," "bargain" and
"sell," shall be adjudged an express covenant to the grantee,
his heirs, and other legal representatives, to-wit: that the grantor
was seized of an indefeasible estate in fee simple, free from
encumbrances done or suffered from the grantor, except the

rents and services that may be reserved, as also for quiet
enjoyment against the grantor, his heirs and assigns unless
limited by express words contained in such deed; and the
grantee, his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, may
in any action, assign breaches, as if such covenants were expressly inserted: Provided, always, that this law shall not
extend to leases at rackrent, or leases not exceeding one and
twenty years, where the actual possession goes with the lease.

The language of the foregoing sections is substantially
the same as that in the Conveyances Acts of 1827 and
1872. The provision for statutory forms of conveyance
originated in the Act of 1872, and Section 9, prescribing
a statutory form of warranty deed, has not been changed
in wording or effect. A number of the cases cited in footnote 19 were decided under the Statute of 1872. These
cases indicate that a quitclaim deed not purporting to
convey more than the grantor's present interest will not
pass a contingent remainder or other contingent interest
upon the resolution of the contingency. Such a deed must
contain words of bargain and sale of the land or purport
to convey a fee simple in order to pass after acquired
title; if it does, the interest will pass to the grantee in
the event that it later vests in the grantor and in some
cases, as will be seen, if it thereafter becomes vested in
his heirs or devisees.
In a leading case 7 it was held that even a doubly contingent interest was passed by covenants in a deed. The
interest was contingent upon the life beneficiary's predeceasing the ultimate beneficiary. The doctrine of estoppel by deed controlled, and it was held that upon the resolution of both contingencies the interest would vest in
47

Walton v. Follansbee, 131 Ill. 147, 23 N. E. 332 (1889).
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the grantee.
It has also been held that if the contingency is never
resolved so that the transferee shall benefit, the transferee cannot claim from the transferor more than the
transferor had at the time of the deed, or, in other words,
should the transferor acquire the title other than by the
happening of the contingency, it is not subject to the
estoppel.4 8
A case49 involving the construction of two deeds and
a will has received considerable attention. The testator
died in 1854, leaving his property to his wife, Nancy, for
life and to her children after her death; and if Nancy did
not have children that would live to inherit said property,
then, at the death of Nancy, to Moses Golloday and his
heirs. Nancy had no children at the death of testator but
remarried and had one child who lived to be 23 years of
age and predeceased Nancy. Moses died in 1855, leaving
two children, William and Mary. William, in 1900, executed a warranty deed purporting to convey the property involved in the bill and died intestate January 1,
1904. Mary died intestate in 1890, leaving six children
as her only heirs. One of her sons, on February 27, 1904,
conveyed his interest in the land by warranty deed to the
grantee of William. Nancy died in 1907. The remainder
was held to be contingent with a double aspect to be
determined upon the death of Nancy. The court also held
that the devise over to the heirs of Moses took effect
upon, but not before, the death of Nancy; that the heirs
of Moses who predeceased Nancy took nothing and William had nothing to convey by warranty deed; that
William's children who asserted title were not estopped
by the covenants in their father's deed since they took
title under the will of the testator; that had William's
children claimed by descent from their father, they would
have been barred by Section 6 of the Conveyances Act
48
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49 Golloday v. Knock, 235 Ill. 412, 85 N. E. 649 (1908).
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which would have transferred the remainder he purported to convey as soon as it descended to them. It was
also held that the other deed, in which one of the children
of Mary was grantor and who survived the life tenant,
operated to transfer his share under Section 6 of the
Act. Under the first deed, the grantee took nothing under
the doctrine of Thomas v. Miller 5 and under the second
deed he obtained the grantor's interest under the same
51
rule as announced in Walton v. Follasbee.
A later case52 illustrates that warranty deeds are effective only to the extent of the interest warranted. The
land was held under a limitation to one for life and remainder to the issue surviving the life tenant. The life
tenant had twelve children, six of whom died in infancy
and six of whom reached their majority. Four of the six
adults made conveyances by warranty deeds purporting
to convey their interests while their father and the other
five adult remaindermen were still alive. Prior to the
death of the life tenant, two of the four children who had
conveyed and one who had not conveyed died. The question for decision was the size of the interest taken by the
transferees upon the death of the life tenant. It was
held that the transferors each took a third, because there
were only three survivors, but their warranties were effective to the extent only of the interest warranted; that
although the conveyance was in the form of a conveyance
of all right, title, and interest in and to the property, the
warranty was in terms limited to one-sixth. It was held
that the grantors had no estate to convey at the time the
deeds were made.
The rules of transferability by estoppel, applicable to
contingent remainders, also apply in the same manner to
executory interests and the latter can be conveyed by
estoppel but do not pass by the conveyance directly. In
50 161 Ill. 60, 43 N. E. 848 (1896).
51 131 Ill. 147, 23 N. E. 332 (1889).
52 Robeson v. Cochran, 255 Ill. 355, 99 N. E. 649 (1912).
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Pitzer v. Morrison," there was a life estate to Susan with
a remainder in fee to James, and an executory devise over
to the testator's wife and daughter if James predeceased
them, with a further gift over to the heirs of James upon
the death of the testator's wife and daughter, providing
the latter left no children. Susan, James and his wife,
and the testator's wife and daughter conveyed by warranty deed to Morrison. It was held that the grantee
took the fee, subject only to the gift over to the wife and
daughter; that although the gift over was an executory
devise and did not pass by their deed, it would inure by
way of estoppel to the grantee, and that the warranties of
the wife and daughter bound them and also their heirs.
Pitzer v. Morrison clearly indicated that heirs are
bound by the warranties of their ancestors, in Illinois, but
the clarity of the rule announced in that case was somewhat clouded by the decisions in two later cases.5" The
same will was involved in both of these cases and it contained a provision giving the testator's son, John, a fee
with an executory devise over to the testator's surviving
children if John died without issue. John's brothers and
sisters conveyed to him by warranty deed, and he thereupon claimed to have an indefeasible title in fee simple.
The first case arose from the filing by John of a bill to
remove the executory devise as a cloud upon his title. It
was held that John's title was not indefeasible. Both
parties to the controversey conceded that the estoppel
created by the warranty might prevent the brothers and
sisters, and their heirs as well, from claiming under the
executory devise. The court held that this was the limit
of the estoppel; that it would simply prevent anyone
claiming to take under the executory devise; that if John
died without leaving issue, his fee would be divested, the
gift over would not take effect, and there would, there53 272 Ill. 291, 111 N. E. 1017 (1916).
54 Gavin v. Carroll, 276 Ill. 478, 114 N. E. 927 (1917) ; Smith v. Carroll,
286 Ill. 137, 121 N. E. 254 (1918).
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fore, be an intestacy. It would appear from this that it
was not certain that John would get anything. In the
second case involving the same will, the Supreme Court
stated that more had been said in the earlier opinion than
was necessary and held that, as events had turned out,
the transferee got title anyhow. The partial recall of the
dicta in the first case clarified the situation considerably
but enough remained to suggest that there may be an
estoppel sufficient to bar the transferor and his heirs or
those claiming under him and yet the transferee would
not get full title if the first taker's interest is divested
so that there would be an intestacy.
The Supreme Court in a later case 55 placed more definite limits upon the doctrine of estoppel in considering
what may be passed by a quitclaim deed. The testator
had devised his property to his son for life with remainders to those persons who might be found to be his descendants or heirs at the time of the son's death. A creditor
of the life tenant acquired his interest in a creditor's
proceeding and thereupon three of the life tenant's eight
children quitclaimed to that creditor. Two of the three
ohilrrPrn whn Pnnvavd inrvvuIad fhpir fnf.hpr nnd l nlnima
a share in the land notwithstanding they had sold and
received pay for their interests. In deciding that these
children shared in the estate, the court stated there can
be no transfer of contingent remainders or executory
interests in Illinois except by release, equitable transfer,
or estoppel.
In a more recent case56 originating in a bill for partition, there is dictum that contingent remainders and executory interests are not transferable. It would seem
from the foregoing cases that, while Illinois is definitely
committed to the rule that such interests are not transferable by conveyance inter vivos, there is some uncertainty
as to whether the warrantor's heirs are bound by estop55 DuBois v. July, 291 Ill. 340, 126 N. E. 104 (1920).
56 Rairitan State Bank v. Huston, 329 Ill. 604, 161 N. E. 141 (1928).
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pel, and that there may be some cases wherein the transferees will not get the title upon the happening of the
contingencies even though the heirs be barred by the estoppel. The difficulty of binding the heirs of the warrantor
and the open question as to when they will be bound provides an element of uncertainty which is undesirable and
could be eliminated by making these interests directly
transferable by conveyances inter vivos.
The limited application of the doctrine of estoppel by
deed and the construction heretofore placed upon the
Conveyances Act justifies an attempt to formulate rules
of some certainty, as to when contingent interests will
pass by deed. The following rules are given by one
writer5 7 following an extensive analysis of the Illinois
cases: (1) Title will inure under Section 7 of the Conveyances Act if the remainder vests during the life of the
transferor and the deed contains covenants; it will not
inure under this section under any deed, other than one
purporting to convey a fee simple, if vesting does not
occur while the transferor is living. (2) If the deed contains covenants or is in the form prescribed by Section
9 of the Act, a contingent remainder or other executory
interest will pass by estoppel. (3) Every executory
interest or contingent remainder which would pass under
Section 7 will also pass under the doctrine of estoppel
by deed but the converse is not true.
There are contingent remainders and executory interests which, in the highest conceivable degree of probability, must vest in some of the named donees, and if there
is a reversion defeasible by such vesting, there is the same
degree of probability that it will never become vested
in possession, indefeasibly or otherwise. An Illinois case 58
involved a deed creating such limitations. The grant
contained limitations of the general form, to A for life
57 Hoopes, Executory Interests in Illinois

(Burdette

J.

Chicago, 1918), p. 195.
58 Belding v. Parsons, 258 Ill. 422, 101 N. E. 570 (1913).

Smith and Co.,
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and on his death, if survived by children, to them; if not
so survived and if there were descendants of the grantor
in being, then to such descendants. If A were not survived
by children, and there were no descendants of the grantor,
then to a named charitable corporation. The reversion of
the grantor was held to be transferable. The interests
of the remaindermen are not immediately transferable
although one or more of such were almost certain to vest
in interest. This obvious inconsistency results from rules
forbidding alienation of all contingent remainders and executory interests, regardless of the degree of certainty of
their vesting, but permitting the transfer of a defeasible
reversion, however remote may be the possibility of its
ever vesting in possession. So long as the transferability
and validity of future interests in land is controlled by
whether or not they are said to be "vested," it is to be
expected that courts will be moved to treat them as such
upon strained constructions, either to save them from the
operation of the Rule against Perpetuities or to permit
their transfer when justice and fair dealing require it. As
a result, one inconsistency is frequently followed by
another, which is the natural consequence of the first.
TRANSFERABILITY IN EQUITY -

RIGHTS OF CREDITORS

Equity developed its own rules for giving effect to
transfers of contingent remainders and executory interests. It was not satisfied with the feudal distinction
between vested and contingent remainders as a test
of alienability and was unwilling that all transfers of
contingent remainders should fail. It has already been
stated that the expectancy of one as the prospective heir
of a living person may be released to the ancestor and
that in equity such a release will be enforced for the benefit of the other heirs. The expectancy of the heir is assignable in equity to a stranger who may, upon the death
of the ancestor, maintain a bill for specific performance.5 9
59 Parsons v. Ely, 45 Ill. 232 (1867); Hudnall v. Ham, 183 Ill. 486, 56
N. E. 172 (1900) ; Donough v. Garland, 269 Il1. 565, 109 N. E. 1015 (1915).
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The court in one case6 ° assumed that a guardian, having
power to deal with the ward's estate, could not, by his
contract to convey, so bind the estate that a court of
equity would give specific performance of an attempt
transfer of a contingent remainder when it vested. Equity
has given specific performance of attempted conveyances
of springing and shifting executory interests, if the event
has happened upon which the future interest is to take
effect, by treating them as contracts to convey."' In order
that the assignee may have specific performance, the
conveyance must show an intent to convey the future
interest. If the future interest is not mentioned expressly,
an attempted transfer by quitclaim deed is not sufficient
in equity to transfer the future interest although the
transferor has only the future interest in the land and
nothing else.62
There can be no equitable execution upon contingent remainders by creditor's bill, 63 nor can title pass under an
execution sale on a judgment against the contingent
remaindermen6
Although the law is well settled that a contingent
remainder cannot be levied upon and sold under judicial
process in Illinois, it will, in accordance with a recent
Federal court decision in the Seventh Circuit, pass to a
trustee in bankruptcy and thereby become available as
assets for the benefit of creditors. 6 5 Landis, a resident of,
and owning property in, Illinois, died testate June 15,
1906, leaving his widow and three children surviving.
By his will, he gave all of his estate to his wife for life
60 Hill v. Hill, 264 Ill. 219, 106 N. E. 262 (1914).
61 Ridgeway v. Underwood, 67 Ill. 419 (1873); Cummings v. Lohr, 246
Ill.
577, 92 N. E. 970 (1910).
62 Kingman v. Harmon, 131 Ill. 171, 23 N. E. 430 (1890).
63 Kenwood Trust Co. v. Palmer, 285 I1. 552, 121 N. E. 186 (1918).
64 Mittel v. Karl, 133 Ill. 65, 24 N. E. 553 (1890) ; Temple v. Scott, 143
Ill. 290, 32 N. E. 366 (1892) ; Madison v. Larmon, 170 Ill. 65, 48 N. E. 556
(1897) ; Phayer v. Kennedy, 169 Ill. 360, 48 N. E. 828 (1897) ; Spengler v.
Kuhn, 212 Il1. 186, 72 N. E. 214 (1904) ; Robertson v. Guenther, 241 Ill. 511,
89 N. E. 689 (1909) ; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Hoppin, 214 F. 928 (1914).
65 In re Landis, 41 F. (2d) 700 (1930).
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and provided that after the expiration of the life estate,
the remainder in the real estate should go to the three
children. One of the testator's sons was adjudged a
bankrupt on June 18, 1925, while the widow was still alive,
and notwithstanding the will expressly provided that the
interests given to his children should not become vested
during the life time of his wife, the District Court held
that the bankrupt's interest was a vested remainder and
passed to the trustee. The question for decision was
whether or not the lands devised to the bankrupt were
assets in the hands of the trustee under U.S.C.A., Tit. 11,
paragraph 110 (a5). It was contended on the one hand
that the interest was a contingent remainder and did not
pass to the trustee and, on the other hand, that it was a
vested remainder but that, whether vested or contingent,
it passed as assets of the bankrupt.
Upon appeal, it was held that the remainder was contingent; that if, under the Illinois law, a contingent remainder passed to the trustee, the order of the lower
court should be affirmed notwithstanding it erred in
holding the remainder to be vested. The foregoing section

Act specifiesC two7 classes of pnropenrtyx
of thknkipy
which by operation of law vest in the trustee: (1) all
property which, prior to the filing of the petition, the
bankrupt could, by any means, have transferred; (2)
all property which, prior to the filing of the petition,
might have been levied upon and sold under judicial
process against him. Since the land was in Illinois, the
law of this state was held to control as to what property
falls within these classes. A contingent remainder does
not fall within the second class but does fall within the
first, since, although it cannot be granted, it may be transferred by warranty deed by way of estoppel and is assignable in equity pursuant to a contract of sale when made
for a valid consideration. It was held that under the
Illinois law "means" existed by which the bankrupt
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could have transferred the contingent remainder and that
it therefore passed to the trustee. Since the Illinois state
courts hold that contingent interests are not transferable
in Illinois and the Federal courts say that they are not
precluded by the Illinois decisions as to what constitutes
transferability, it follows that if the question is litigated
in the Federal courts these interests pass to the trustee,
but if litigated collaterally in the Illinois courts they do
not pass.
DESCENDIBILITY OF CONTINGENT INTERESTS

It may be concluded from the Illinois decisions that
contingent remainders will descend to the heirs of the
remaindermen and that executory interests will also similarly descend to the heirs of the owners providing there
is no uncertainty as to the persons who are to take and
provided there are no conditions precedent that such
persons be in esse at a particular time.(6 Dicta can be
found in the Illinois decisions that might lead to the
erroneous conclusion that if a remainder is contingent
upon some event which may occur after the death of the
remainderman, and the remainderman dies before the life
tenant and before the contingency happens, the remainder
perishes and the grantor takes by way of reversion. In one
of these cases,( 7 the remainder was subject to a condition
precedent that the life tenant should die without issue
surviving. The life tenant outlived the remainderman
and died without issue, and it was held that the remainder
descended to the heirs of the remainderman. The court,
however, called the remainder vested by adopting the
New York statutory definition. The language of this decision is such as easily to lead the reader to the erroneous
inference that if the remainder had been contingent it
could not have passed by descent. It is held in some of the
66 Fearne, Contingent Remainders, p. 364;
342, 80 N. E. 339 (1907); Drury v. Drury,
(1916) ; Fitzgerald v. Daly, 284 II1. 42, 119 N.
67 Chapin v. Nott, 203 I1. 341, 67 N. E. 833

Ortmayer v. Elcock, 225 Il.
271 Ill. 336, 111 N. E. 140
E. 911 (1918).
(1903).
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cases cited in footnote 66 that a contingent remainder or
an executory interest will pass by devise if, in the absence
of devise, it would descend to the testator's heirs.
TRANSFERABILITY OF RIGHTS OF ENTRY AND
POSSIBILITY OF REVERTER IN ILLINOIS

The term "possibility of reverter," in its larger meaning, includes both the right of entry upon a breach of a
condition subsequent and the right remaining in the
grantor or the testator's heirs following the creation of
a fee upon a special limitation, or a determinable fee, as
it is more frequently designated.
A right of entry for condition broken is not subject
to the Rule against Perpetuities, 68 nor is a possibility of
reverter after a determinable fee.69 Both of these interests were recognized by the feudal land law long before
the appearance of the Rule against Perpetuities, and
since that rule was evolved to limit the creation of new
interests made possible after the Statute of Uses and the
Statute of Wills, it was to be expected that those existing
interests would both be excepted from its application.
This the Illinois courts have done. The English courts
apply the Rule to rights of entry but not to possibilities
of reverter.70 Legislation subjecting powers of termination upon breach of a condition subsequent and possibilities of reverter to the application of the Rule against
Perpetuities would seem to be desirable. The same disfavored postponement of vesting attends a possibility of
reverter or power of termination on breach of condition
subsequent as attends an executory interest limited upon
the same event, and since the latter is subject to the Rule,
there is no sound reason for not similarly restricting the
effective duration of the former.
At common law, the attempted transfer of a right to
68
69
70
secs.

Wakefield v. VanTassell, 202 I1. 41, 66 N. E. 830 (1903).
Mott v. Danville Seminary, 129 Ill. 403, 21 N. E. 927 (1889).
Gray's Rule Against Perpetuities (Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1886),
299-313.
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re-enter destroyed the right in the attempting transferor.
A number of states have followed the common law rule,
but there appears to be no Illinois decision holding that
the attempted alienation of the right terminated it. The
Illinois decisions 7' generally hold that a right of entry
for a breach of a condition can only be taken advantage
of by the grantor and that it descends to the grantor's or
the testator's heirs. It was expressly held in O'Donnellv.
Robson"72 that a right of entry for breach of a condition
is not devisable, but in two cases 73 the court has used
language indicating that such a right is devisable, and in
an earlier case 74 it was stated by way of dictum that the
right of entry was assignable. Because such statements
are nothing more than dicta and because there are express
holdings to the contrary, it seems correct to state that
rights of entry are neither devisable nor are they assignable before breach. In the case of a condition subsequent
attached to an estate for life or for years, the. right of
75
entry passes to the assignee of the reversion.
The conveyance of land in fee, subject to condition subsequent, is a device or means that has been utilized both
to coerce affirmative action by the grantee and to encourage abstinence from undesired action by him, his heirs or
assigns and, upon occasion, to provide a termination of
the granted interest without such coercion. The socially
desirable or undesirable character of the results sought
to be accomplished by conditions subsequent is frequently
the determining factor as to their validity. Grants have
been made subject to a re-entry in Illinois if the grantee
failed to pay the taxes and assessments, 76 failed to main71 O'Donnell v. Robson, 239 Il1. 634, 88 N. E. 175 (1909) ; Golconda Ry.
Co. v. Gulf Lines R. R., 265 I1. 194, 106 N. E. 818 (1914).
72 239 Ill. 634, 88 N. E. 175 (1909).
73 Boone v. Clark, 129 Ill. 466, 21 N. E. 850 (1889) ; Gray v. Chicago,
M. & St. P. Ry., 189 Ill. 400, 59 N. E. 950 (1901).
74 Helm v. Webster, 85 Ill. 116 (1877).
75 Fisher v. Deering, 60 Ill. 114 (1871) ; Barnes v. Northern Trust Co.,
169 Ill. 112, 48 N. E. 31 (1897).
76 Dodsworth v. Dodsworth, 254 Ill. 49, 98 N. E. 279 (1912).
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tain a mill upon the conveyed land,7 7 or if the grantee
failed to care for the grave of the grantor."8
The existence of determinable fees and possibilities of
reverter since the Statute of Quia Emptores has long
been questioned in some jurisdictions, but it is beyond
79
question that they may be created in Illinois.
A leading case settled it as the law of Illinois that,
upon dissolution of a charitable corporation having
neither stockholders nor creditors, land which had been
conveyed to it by way of gift reverts to the original
donor, and that a conveyance by such donor after the
corporation was dissolved and before he had made an
entry or done any other act to perfect a forfeiture, was
sufficient to pass a fee simple. The court did not hold that
there was a condition subsequent implied by law which
had been breached by the dissolution of the corporation
but, on the contrary, called the interest of the donor a
possibility of reverter. It might have been held that the
land or its proceeds should be distributed cy pres, or that
it escheated to the county or to the state. The latter disposition would have been contrary to the feudal rule that
upon the dissolution of a corporation, the donor shall
have the land and not the lord by escheat."
The question has been raised as to the nature of the
interest of the dedicator following a statutory dedication
of the fee simple estate to a state or to a municipality. The
Illinois decisions recognize the right of the original dedicator to recover back the land upon vacation of the dedication but whether this right is a possibility of reverter
or a right of entry upon breach of a condition subsequent
7 McElvain v. Dorris, 298 I11. 377, 131 N. E. 608 (1921).
78 Dunne v. Minsor, 312 Ill. 333, 143 N. E. 842 (1924).
79 Hunter v. Middletown, 13 Ill. 50 (1851) ; Gebhart v. Reeves, 75 Ill. 301
(1874); Zinc Co. v. City of La Salle, 117 Ill. 411, 2 N. E. 406 (1886);
North v. Graham, 235 Ill. 178, 85 N. E. 267 (1908) ; Dees v. Cheuvronts, 240
Ill. 486, 88 N. E. 1011 (1909) ; City of Berwyn v. Berglund, 255 Ill. 498, 99
N. E. 705 (1912) ; Hart v. Lake, 273 Ill. 60, 112 N. E. 286 (1916).
80 Mott v. Danville Seminary, 129 Il. 403, 21 N. E. 927 (1889).
81 Co. Litt., 13b.
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depends upon the statute relating to Vacation of Streets8 2
the dedicator to be implied from
and upon the intent of
3
the act of dedication.
The nature of the dedicator's interest is necessarily
involved where the question arises as to the alienability
of his interest after vacation of the dedicated property
and before any act in the nature of a re-entry is done by
the dedicator or his heirs. The question was raised in a
United States Supreme Court case,84 where the court
assumed that the fee had vested by dedication in the
town for school and church purposes. The town made a
conveyance of the land for other purposes, and thereafter
the heirs of the dedicator, without having made a re-entry
or done any act equivalent thereto, conveyed to the plaintiffs, who brought an action of ejectment. It was held that
the right of the heirs was not a possibility of reverter
but a right to enter for breach of a condition subsequent;
that if the condition subsequent was broken, the estate
continued until forfeiture was consummated; that this
could be done only by the grantor or his heirs; and that
after breach only a right of action existed which, at that
time, could not be conveyed so as to vest the right to sue
in a stranger.
The rights of owners of property abutting upon a street
or highway to the fee in the street or highway in case it
is vacated depend upon the nature of the dedication and
the provisions of the statute. Where the dedication
passes a fee in the street, with a right in the dedicator
to retake possession in case of a vacation, the deed of the
dedicator covering abutting property ought to be construed as expressing an intent to transfer his right in the
street, since it has always been held that a conveyance by
the owner of land abutting a highway, fee of which is in
him, carries with it the fee in the highway. The difficulty
82

Ill. Rev. Stats. 1937, Ch. 145, § 2.

88 St. John v. Quitzow, 72 Ill. 334 (1874); Helm v. Webster, 85 Ill. 116

(1877) ; Village of Hyde Park v. Borden. 94 Ill. 26 (1879).
84 Ruck v. Rock Island, 97 U. S. 693 (1878).
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seems to be that the original dedicator has nothing left
but a possibility of reverter or a right of entry for condition broken, and this cannot be transferred to a stranger.""
In another case,8" the abutting owner was defending his
possession in a street that had been vacated after a statutory dedication. The plaintiff was the grantee of the
original dedicator in a deed executed before the vacation
had occurred. Since the court affirmed a judgment in
favor of the plaintiff, this must be taken as holding that
the right of the original dedicator was transferable
by deed to the plaintiff. The decision in this case seems to
have been based upon the legislation in favor of the abutting owner and to have been restricted in its application
to streets or highways vacated by act or acts of the state.
There have been three of these acts regulating vacation
of streets, alleys, and highways in force in Illinois,
known as the Acts of 1851, 1865, and 1874. The acts have
been construed as limited in their application to lands
which by dedication come into possession of the state or
some municipal corporation as distinguished from a
private person or corporation. These acts have apparently mlodfied the common law rules asto the eistcnc,
of a possibility of reverter in land so dedicated. The acts
do not unjustly favor the abutting owner as against the
original dedicator provided that they are not retroactive
in their operation. The legislature has merely done, in
the case of a statutory dedication, that which the courts
have done in the case of a common law dedication where
the fee did not pass. It is presumed that the dedicator
who sells land abutting on a street has knowledge that he
is parting with all his interest in the street and will price
the land accordingly. Moreover, it is socially undesirable
that small strips of land should revert back to the dedicator or his heirs.
85

Gebhardt v. Reeves, 75 III. 301 (1874).

86 Helm v. Webster, 95 Ill. 116 (1877).
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SUGGESTED REMEDIAL LEGIsATIx1

Only a small portion of the Illinois law of Future Interests has been discussed and that more or less cursorily. It is believed that the principles and decisions considered are sufficient to show the extent to which the Illinois law remains permeated with feudal characteristics,
many of which. no longer have any utility. Real property
law is notoriously conservative but there seems to be no
excuse for the retention of ancient rules which our neighbors have long since discarded. A careful investigation
indicates that only five states follow the feudal rule
of inalienability of contingent remainders and executory
interests, borrowed from England in the 17th century.
These states are Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Maryland
and New Hampshire. As has been seen, the rule has
been discarded in England. Nine states appear to have
followed the English method of providing full transferability by gradual evolution. In this group are found
Indiana, Iowa, Nebraska, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon,
South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas. Another group
of eight states seem to have made such interests fully
transferable by judicial construction of conveyances acts
similar to the Illinois act. Included in these states are
Arkansas, Colorado, Kansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, Virginia, and West Virginia. All or nearly all of the
remaining states have made such interests fully transferable by express statutory enactment. Moreover, Illinois seems to be the only state in which contingent remainders are both indestructible and inalienable.
The lag in real property law is further emphasized by
the persistence of the Rule in Shelly's Case in Illinois,
a rule concerning which it has been said frequently that
it never operates except to defeat the intention of the
settlor. Only a few of the states retain this rule.
There is just cause for criticism of the retention of rules
that never had any utility or whose utility was confined to
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feudal environments. The courts cannot change such of
these rules as have become absolute rules of property.
The remedy is to be found in legislation permitting full
alienation of all interests in land and the abolition of
other fossilized rules of property such, for example, as the
Rule in Shelly's Case.

